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Abstract
We review an extensive literature debating the merits of alternative
priority structures for banking liabilities put forward by …nancial econo-
mists, legal scholars and policymakers. Up to now, this work has focused
exclusively on the relative advantages of each group of creditors to monitor
the activities of bankers. We argue that systemic risk is another dimen-
sion that this discussion must include. The main message of our work is
that when bank failures are contagious then when regulators assign pri-
ority rights need also to take into account how the bankruptcy resolution
of one institution might a¤ect the survival of other institutions that have
acted as its creditors. When the network structure is …xed the solution is
straightforward. Other banks should have priority to minimize the risk of
their downfall. However, if the choice of policy can a¤ect the structure of
the network, policy design becomes more complex.This is a fruitful avenue
for future research.
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1 Introduction
There is a hierarchy among a …rm’s creditors that is relevant when the …rm be-
comes insolvent. The hierarchy re‡ects the allocation of priority rights among
the creditors such that those higher in the hierarchy are paid in full before any
other parties below receive any compensation.1 This di¤erential protection of-
fered by the allocation of property rights has been designed to optimize the
ability of the …rm to raise funds from …nancial markets. Since the 2008 global
…nancial crisis there has been a lot of interest in the design of bankruptcy res-
olution procedures and priority rules for banks.2 What is striking is the large
variety of both bankruptcy procedures (Berkovitch and Israel, 1999) and prior-
ity rules applied across the globe (Lenihan, 2012; Wood, 2011). Some countries
have had for some time some form of depositor preference rule (e.g. Australia,
Switzerland and United States). Other countries have either only recently in-
troduced or are in the process of introducing such rules. These include Greece,
Portugal, Hungary, Latvia and Romania that have to implement such rules as
part of the conditions that they need to meet in order to participate in EU/IMF
programmes. In the UK the Vickers report recommends the introduction of a
depositor preference rule (ICB Report 2011).
Most of the arguments o¤ered for the support of proposals concerning prior-
ity rules are based on the incentives that these rules provide to depositors and
other creditors to monitor the activities of bank managers. However, as Dewa-
tripont and Freixas (2012) point out bankruptcy rules that might be optimal
responses to individual bank failures might not be e¢cient when the crisis is
systemic. In particular, they observe that adequate liquidity provision to solvent
institutions might be su¢cient to avert contagion throughout the system in the
case of a single bank failure but not so during a systemic crisis. In the latter
case, liquidity shortages and the depression of asset prices used as collateral (…re
sales) might demand support for both solvent and insolvent institutions.
In this paper we review various arguments put forward by both economists
and legal scholars supporting either existing or new proposals for priority rules in
banking. Our main focus is on the relative positions on the ladder of depositors
and other …nancial institutions linked through the interbank market. In our
review we include both theoretical arguments and related empirical evidence.
Reading this literature we were surprised by the absence of any arguments
related to systemic risk issues. In the penultimate section of the paper we
argue that the choice of priority rules can have considerable implications for the
propagation of failures across the …nancial system.
1 There is an extensive literature in …nancial economics that studies the optimal design of
bankruptcy procedures; see von Thadden et al. (2010) for a recent review of the relevant
literature.
2 See Walter (2004) for a description of the actuall process of bankruptcy resolution followed
in US during the …nancial crisis.
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2 Priority Rules in Practice
As we indicated above there are variations in bankruptcy procedures and rules
applied around the globe. To focus the discussion we begin by taking a close
look at one such priority structure, namely, that of US bank balance sheets as
presented in Wood (2011).
1. Super-priority creditors (secured creditors)
(a) creditors with security interests over collateral
(b) sale and repurchase agreements (repos)
2. Priority creditors
(a) retail depositors
(b) life/pension insurance claimants
(c) employee remuneration and bene…ts
(d) unpaid taxes
3. Pari passu creditors
(a) banks
(b) bondholders
4. Subordinated creditors (tier structure)
(a) senior subordinated
(b) junior subordinated
(c) preferred shares
5. Equity shareholders
6. Expropriated creditors
(a) foreign currency creditors
Right at the top of the list (most senior instruments) we …nd contracts
secured by collateral. During systemic events it is the collapse of the prices of the
underlying assets pledged as collateral that dries up the liquidity of the …nancial
system. Before the 2008 …nancial crisis many banks had pledged as collateral
very similar assets created though the securitization of mortgages. One of the
causes of the crisis has been the enhanced uncertainty that surrounded the
valuation of these assets. As some institutions attempted to obtain liquidity by
selling these assets, they drove their prices down, directly a¤ecting the value of
collateral pledged by other institutions. This led to further drops in prices (…re
sales). This phenomenon has been extensively researched in recent years and
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also lies behind the Dewatripont and Freixas (2012) argument for a di¤erential
treatment of failing banks during a systemic crisis.3 In case of insolvency, assets
not pledged as collateral will be distributed to other creditor following the above
seniority structure.
What is most relevant for our purposes is the relative positions of retail
depositors and banks. The ‘banks’ entry in the above table mainly captures
transactions in the interbank market (loans of durations from one day to three
months). The interbank market provides the links that connect the banking
network. The severity, in terms of aggregate losses, of a …nancial crisis depends
on the exact structure of the network and the magnitude of initial losses. There
is an extensive literature studying the structure of such a network and its im-
plications for systemic risk.4 While the relationship between connectedness and
systemic risk is complex some general patterns have been identi…ed: for exam-
ple, for low values of initial losses a higher degree of connectedness is good news
as the losses are spread out and thus the impact on any particular institution
is minimized; in contrast, when initial losses are large a high degree of con-
nectedness can be harmful as it increases the likelihood of multiple failures (see
Acemoglu et al., 2015a).
The particular structure shown above re‡ects the enactment by the US
Congress of the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
that was followed by the 1993 Depositor Preference Act. Both acts were part
of the policy response to the 1980s Savings and Loans crisis. The purpose for
introducing the 1991 Act was to shift some of the risk of bank failures away from
taxpayers and uninsured depositors and more to other creditors thus reducing
the cost of federally provided insurance. Similar concerns led to the introduc-
tion of explicit rules in the Single Resolution Mechanism specifying ptotective
measures for the depositor guarantee scheeme.5 Thus, deposits are senior to
bonds and interbank market loans which, in turn, are senior to subordinated
debt.6 As we observed earlier, the above structure is not universal and the rel-
ative positions of uninsured depositors and other creditors varies from country
to country.
There is a variety of both theoretical and informal arguments that have been
advanced in support of various priority rules.
3 For a general analysis, see Shleifer and Vishny (1992). More recently, this work has been
applied to banking to explain …re sales, market freezes, market spirals and related phenomena
(see, for example, Acharya et al., 2011; Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011; Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009; Caballero and Simsek, 2013; Diamond and Rajan, 2011) For a more thorough
review of this literature, see Shleifer and Vishny (2010).
4 For reviews of the literature see Allen and Babus (2009) and Bougheas and Kirman
(2015a).
5 See Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament Council of July 2014.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806
6 By tier structure we imply that the entries under subordinated debt are also ordered
according to seniority.
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3 Theoretical Arguments
There is a long debate about whether uninsured depositors have the incentives
to monitor the activities of banks.7 Calomiris and Kahn (1991) have argued that
by its very nature demandable debt (demand deposits), that allows depositors
to withdraw their funds at will, o¤ers the required market discipline device.
As Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have shown the role of demand deposits is
to provide insurance to depositors against indiosyncratic liquidity risk. More
speci…cally, the contract o¤ers risk-averse depositors ‡exibility with the timing
of their withdrawals while at the same time allows banks to invest in long-term
illiquid projects. However, inherent in the design is the possibility of a bank
run where all depositors withdraw their funds at the same time. These runs
are not only rational, given the beliefs that each depositor holds about the
actions of other depositors, but can also be ex ante optimal (Allen and Gale,
2007). That is the decision of depositors to trust their funds to banks can be
ex ante e¢cient as long as the probability of runs is relatively small. Runs
in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework are pure sunspot phenomena.
Put di¤erently, they arise as because of coordination failures and it is not clear
why in such environments depositors would be appropriate monitors. However,
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) allow the investment of banks to be risky and
show that widespread runs can be generated by a small number of informed
depositors who receive early signals about the bank’s performance. It seems in
that model informed depositors are performing the monitoring role.
Rochet and Tirole (1996) o¤er support for the argument that the most suit-
able monitors for banks are other banks and therefore interbank loans should
be junior to deposits. They argue that interbank exposures generated through
transactions in the interbank market provide strong incentives for banks to mon-
itor other banks.8 Clearly, the e¤ectiveness of such incentives would depend on
whether or not banks believe that the government will intervene in their favour
during a crisis. If they believe that the government is likely to come to the
rescue, of at least large institutions, then they might consider that some trans-
actions in that market do not bear any risk. Since the 1998 global …nancial
crisis a growing literature is attempting to address the vulnerability of …nancial
systems to institutions that are ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ (Kaufman, 2014).
Along similar lines, Birchler (2000) has argued in favor of depositor pref-
erence on the grounds that other creditors, like banks, have an informational
advantage relative to a large number of small depositors.9 Moreover, he ar-
gues that o¤ering a standardized product to depositors with priority rights is
7 Beyong their e¤ects on the incentives to monitor, changes in priority rules can have other
consequences. Such changes would a¤ect the prices of those claims whose priority has been
a¤ected, potentially changing their ownership and thus the entities a¤ected in the case of
bankruptcy (see Danisewicz et al., 2015).
8 Their argument bears some similarity to the one used for supporting the seniority of bank
claims on the balance sheets of other …rms (see Longofer and Santos, 2000).
9 His work is an application to banking of earlier theoretical work on the role of seniority
on corporate balance sheets (see, for example, Diamond, 1993; Hart and Moore, 1995).
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a more e¢cient way of raising funds than having each depositor sign a bilat-
eral contract with a bank. Therefore, his framework explains why the balance
sheets of borrowers include a whole variety of debt instruments that di¤er ac-
cording to their seniority status. The introduction of a priority list reduces the
amount of resources devoted to socially ine¢cient information gathering. Such
an arrangement it seems is ideal for banks that raise funds from a large number
of uninformed investors.
While each of the above studies clearly supports either depositor or bank
preference, Freixas, Rochet and Parigi (2004) o¤er a more mixed view. In their
model banks provide two types of services. They screen potential applicants
thus improving the pool of loans that they o¤er and monitor …rms that receive
loans to ensure they perform well. Banks are subject to both liquidity and
solvency shocks. The role of the interbank market is to redistribute funds from
liquid to illiquid institutions, however, insolvent institutions cannot be prevented
from using the market to gamble for resurrection. The optimal seniority status
of interbank market loans depends on which of the two moral hazard problems
associated with two services provided by banks is the most severe. When market
discipline is weak then monitoring services become important. In this case,
the only banks that seek funds from the interbank market are those that are
illiquid and solvent banks and should not be penalized by excessive risk premia.
Thus, it is optimal that interbank market loans are either secured or senior
to other claims. In contrast, when the screening constraint binds then the
interbank market loans cannot be secured and the premia must re‡ect the cost
of insolvency.
The majority of studies that analyze the seniority structure of bank loans
focus on the interbank market where loans are not secured. However, on the
liability side of the balance sheets of banks we …nd other claims by …nancial
institutions that are secured and therefore occupy the top step in the hierarchy
ladder. Bolton and Oehmke (2015) analyze the seniority status of derivatives.
They conclude that while these claims enhance value by providing risk manage-
ment solutions, their seniority status can lead to ine¢ciencies as it transfers risk
to other liabilityholders, such as depositors.
Lastly, there are also studies arguing that the most suitable monitors of bank
activities are subordinated debtholders. The idea is that the market will provide
the discipline required for reducing risk taking activities.10 Theoretical work by
Blum (2002) sheds some doubt about the e¢cacy of this policy. Requiring
banks to hold some prespeci…ed amount of subordinated debt may not prevent
banks from pursuing high-risk activities and even worse might induce them to
undertake even higher-risk activities. The reason is that protection by limited
liability o¤ers incentives to banks to decrease the cost of debt by increasing the
amount of their borrowing as soon as the interest rate is …xed by the market.
Thus there is a trade-o¤ between the bene…ts derived from obtaining information
about what banks do and the costs associated with the increase in balance sheet
risk.
10 See Evano¤ (1993) and Herring (2004) for support of this view.
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At this point we notice that, with the one exception the work by Rochet
and Tirole (1996), research in this area does not directly address the issue of
contagion.
4 Informal Arguments
Overall, the types of arguments that have been o¤ered in favour of one priority
rule over another follow the theoretical literature discussed above by advocating
that the party most suited to monitor the activities of banks should be relatively
low in the priority hierarchy. This particular debate has focused on …ve types
of bank creditors: insured depositors, uninsured depositors, international de-
positors, other banks and subordinated debtholders. However, there are many
researchers and legal scholars who put more emphasis on the implementation
of rules arguing that often preference rules have unintended consequences.
Among domestic depositors only those with uninsured claims have an incen-
tive to monitor their banks.11 Do they do it? The evidence is mixed. Jordan
(2004) studying a sample of banks that failed in New England during the 1990s
…nds that uninsured depositors respond to bad news. At times these depositors
not only react in a severe fashion but also start as early as two years before the
bank is closed. The author concludes that the ability of banks to raise funds in
the insured deposit market delays the closure of banks by dampening the e¤ects
due to the actions of uninsured depositors. A similar conclusion is reached by
Billett, Gar…nkel, and O’Neal (1998) who analyzed announcements of credit
rating changes for bank holding companies (BHCs) for the period January 1990
through December 1995. They …nd that banks increase their use of insured de-
posits after they have been downgraded by Moody’s. Thus they conclude that
an increase in the interest rate that they have to pay to attract uninsured de-
posits, or even the withdrawal of uninsured deposits, may not have a signi…cant
e¤ect on banks’ risk taking decisions.
Other scholars have warned about unintended consequences of depositor
preference rules. For example, Kaufman (1997) criticizing the 1993 Depositor
Preference Act observed that depositor priority rules can be circumvented by
nonpreferred claimants who e¤ectively become preferred claimants when the
borrower secures their funding by o¤ering them collateral.12 Thomson (1994)
and Marino and Bennett (1999) have argued that while the regulation seems
to have worked with small bank failures it had unintended consequences with
troubled larger institutions. Because the latter have a higher proportion of
unsecured and international deposits, they faced a greater risk from the actions
of those parties’ national governments to protect them.13
Concerns have also been expressed more recently by Partnoy and Skeel
(2007) and Perotti (2010) in response to bankruptcy privileges granted in 2005
11 See Mantripragada (1992) for support of this view from a legal perspective.
12 There is a similarity between this argument and the theoretcal argument put forward by
Bolton and Oehmke (2015) related to the role of derivatives.
13 The 1993 Act placed international deposits very low on the priority ladder
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in both the US and Europe to overnight secured credit and derivatives that
have e¤ectively allowed these lenders to claim priority over all other creditors
in case of default. They assert that while such regulations reduce considerably
the cost of borrowing at the same time they eliminate all the incentives the
privileged creditors have to monitor the borrowers. In times of …nancial trouble
these are the creditors who keep providing funds to stressed institutions exactly
because the last minute loans that they o¤er are secured. Along the same lines
Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990) argue that if a large enough proportion of nonde-
positor claims becomes secured, depositor preference could increase the cost of
bank failures to the deposit insurance agency. Their empirical analysis indicates
that depositor preference will lead to a considerable increase in collateralization
thus taking away funds during a resolution that would have been available for
distribution to depositors..
As we have already observed unintended consequences are also associated
with proposals aiming to delegate the monitoring role to subordinated debthold-
ers. The evidence comes primarily from comparing yields of subordinated bonds
and the performance of the issuing banks and, once more, is mixed (see Evano¤
and Wall, 2002; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Goyal, 2005; Hancock and Kwast,
2001; Sironi, 2003).
Lastly, we turn our attention to the interbank market that is the main focus
of our work. Evidence about the monitoring role played by creditors in this
market comes from Fur…ne (2001) who collected every Fedwire funds transfer
made during the …rst quarter of 1998. The main empirical …ndings of this study
are: (a) banks with higher pro…tability, higher capital ratios, and fewer problem
loans are charged lower interest rates on federal funds loans, and (b) larger
institutions have an advantage as they pay lower interest rates on borrowed
funds and charge higher interest rates on their loans. The evidence seems to
suggest that banks can e¢ciently monitor other banks, however, there are also
some potential problems. Firstly, the advantage of larger banks is consistent
with the belief that these banks are ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’. Secondly, the rates re‡ect
only counterparty risk. Thirdly, the study was conducted during a calm period
in …nancial markets. Taken together these three arguments raise concerns about
the ability of banks to monitor themselves during systemic events.
5 Priority Claims and Systemic Risk
The literature on the optimal design of the priority structure of banking liabili-
ties has exclusively focused on the incentives that alternative structures provide
for risk taking and monitoring at the institutional level. As a consequence, the
main arguments put forward are based at the relative abilities of various credi-
tors to monitor the activities of bank managers. However, we argue that given
the interconnectedness of the banking system, restricting the scope of the design
at the institutional level might be potentially socially harmful. Cross-banking
exposures through the interbank market imply that a failure of one institution
can harm other directly linked institutions potentially leading to a cascade of
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failures throughout the system. In general, the level of systemic risk (potential
aggregate losses) is not independent of the priority structure of bank liabilities.14
In order to keep the argument as simple as possible, in what follows, we are going
to ignore all other reasons for generating a priority structure mentioned above
and concentrate on systemic risk. Therefore, we will concentrate on total losses
ignoring their division between depositors and bank equityholders. In fact, from
a welfare point of view we need to compare total losses. There might be strong
arguments to protect depositors (this can be the case, for example, if the goal
is to protect the intermediation process by ensuring that depositors trust their
savings with the …nancial system) but in such cases there are other instruments
(e.g. deposit insurance) that can be employed to address such objectives.
For our analysis we consider a network of banks linked through the interbank
market. Table 1 show a typical bank’s balance sheet.
Table 1: Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
 : Loans to …rms  : Deposits by households
: Loans to other banks : Deposits by other banks
: Reserves : Equity
The entries  and  correspond to the links of the network. As it turns
out our main arguments do not depend on the exact structure of the interbank
network. However, it is important to keep in mind that the sum of all the
interbank loans across the banking system is equal to the sum of all deposits
by other banks across the banking system. Equity is de…ned as  ´  +
 +  ¡  ¡ . As long as  > 0 the bank is solvent. However, when
  0 the value of the assets falls below the value of liabilities and the bank
becomes insolvent. In the latter case, the bankruptcy procedure will decide the
division of assets among the bank’s liabilityholders. In particular, a bankruptcy
procedure speci…es rules to allocate the remaining assets to the failing bank’s
liabilityholders, in our case, other banks and depositors.15 There are two broad
rules that every bankruptcy procedure must satisfy:
De…nition 1 Priority Rules: They specify a hierarchy among creditors such
that in liquidation a group of creditors must be satis…ed in full before any other
group of creditors lower in the ladder receive any payments.
De…nition 2 Pro-Rata Rule: All creditors belonging, according to priority rules,
to the same level are compensated proportionately to the amount of their indi-
vidual claims.
14 Our analysis might also be relevant for other sectors of the economy as interconnectedness
is not an exclusive feature of the …nancial system. Foe example, Acemoglu et al. (2015b) study
how interindustry input-output linkages can magnify small idiosyncratic shocks to produce
macroeconomic tail risk. But this is attributed to the fact that they observe the emergence
of a strongly skewed distribution of …rm sizes. They argue as did Gabaix (2011) that a small
shock to a large …rm can produce major events. To do the same here would require considering
also the size distribution of banks and their place in the network.
15 Actual capital requirement regulations imply that there will be regulatory intervention as
soon as equity falls below a prespeci…ed threshold.
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Given that our main interest is in understanding the relationship between
priority rules and systemic losses, in the following discussion, we treat each
group as a single agent.
We consider a bank that has to write-o¤ some of its loans to …rms and we
assume that these losses are higher than the value of its equity so that the
bank becomes insolvent. We would like to …gure out how alternative priority
rules a¤ect not only losses born by the liability holders of the failing bank
but also by the liability holders of other a¤ected banks. The structure of the
interbank network will determine which banks will be a¤ected but this will not
have any e¤ect on our results. As we explained above, in terms of social welfare,
ultimately what matters are the total losses to depositors and equityholders
throughout the banking system.
Dividing the failing bank’s loans to other banks, , among its liability-
holders is, in principle, straightforward. These loans represent deposits of the
failed bank at other banks and they can be reallocated at full value. However,
the allocation of loans to …rms,  , and reserves, , where the latter might
include a variety of assets di¤ering to their degree of market liquidity, might be
problematic. As we explained above these two groups of assets might have to
be liquidated at depressed market prices below corresponding book values (…re
sales) further magnifying initial losses. Let  denote the fraction of the book
value of assets recovered by liquidation (for simplicity we assume that is the
same for all assets) and  ( ) the value of loans written-o¤.
We are going to consider two cases. Firstly, we are going to analyze the
model for the case when book and market values are the same. Put di¤erently,
we will ignore …re sales. For this case will show that priority rules do not matter.
Then, we will introduce …re sales and show that the choice of priority rules can
a¤ect the magnitude of welfare losses due to systemic events.
5.1 No Fire Sales
We …rst consider the case when  = 1 (no …re sales). Then the total losses
su¤ered by depositors and other banks is equal to  ¡ . The exact division
of these losses between the two groups of liabilityholders will depend on the
priority rule. Let  2 [0 1] denote the fraction of these losses born by depositors.
Therefore, the total losses for the failing bank are equal to  + ( ¡ ).
The analysis of what happens with other a¤ected banks who were creditors of
the failing bank and those who were a¤ected because of subsequent failures is
greatly simpli…ed by the existence of a unique clearing vector of payments that
settles the obligations of all members of the banking system (see Acemoglu et
al., 2015a; Eisenberg and Noe, 2001). This important result implies that our
main conclusions follow directly from what we know about the bank that failed
originally. The total losses of the banks that were direct creditors to the failing
bank due to this …rst round of liquidation are at most equal to (1 ¡ )( ¡).
If the losses are equal to the last expression implies that this second round of
liquidations was su¢cient to absorb the losses. Clearly, the losses were born
by their equityholders and maybe, depending on the priority rule, also by their
10
depositors. If, in contrast, some of the losses were absorbed by other banks then
the process is repeated. Notice that some banks that survived earlier rounds of
liquidations might not do so in subsequent rounds. What it is clear is that at
the end of the clearing process the total losses will be equal to  that is equal
to the initial losses. Clearly, total losses are independent of the structure of
the network and the priority rules of bankruptcy. However, the priority rules
matter for the division of these losses between depositors and equityholders.
Proposition 1 In the absence of …re sales neither the structure of the interbank
network nor the priority rules matter for total losses. Priority rules matter for
the division of losses between depositors and equityholders.
5.2 Fire Sales
Next, we consider what happens when   1 (…re sales). In the following analy-
sis we assume that the network structure is independent of the priority rule.
Our only objective in this paper is to show that the design of priority rules has
potentially serious implications for the magnitude of systemic losses. Neverthe-
less, a complete analysis needs to consider that the choice of priority rules might
a¤ect the formation of the interbank network.
For the moment we focus on the bankruptcy procedure of the initial failing
bank ignoring any subsequent rounds.16 The post-liquidation value of the failing
bank’s assets is equal to + (+ ¡ ). Notice that the losses are equal to
(1 ¡ )(+ ¡  ) and are decreasing in . Clearly, the losses borne by other
banks are greater under depositor priority. This matters for the value of total
losses of the …nancial system because of …re sales. The higher the losses borne
by banks the higher the probability that other banks will become insolvent and
the higher the value of total losses given that liquidations are costly. Now, the
structure of the …nancial network matters for the value of total losses, however,
for a …xed network structure the value of total losses is higher under depositor
priority. The following Proposition summarizes.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the formation of the banking network is indepen-
dent of the structure of priority rules. Then, when liquidation is costly (…re
sales) the value of total losses under depositor priority is at least as high as the
total losses under bank priority.
The intuition is straightforward. When bank claims are senior to depositor
claims the likelihood of further liquidations declines. When liquidation is costly
(…re sales) the total losses of the banking system increase with the number of
failing banks.
While the above analysis is too simplistic, as it ignores the incentives that
priority structure o¤er for creating links in the network as well as the incentives
that priority rules o¤er to di¤erent parties to monitor the bank’s activities,
16 The existence and uniqueness of the clearing vector is not violated when   1, see
Acemoglu et al. (2015a).
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we hope that it makes clear that ignoring systemic risk considerations when
designing policy rules might be unwise.
6 Conclusion
The recent global …nancial crisis has made it painfully clear how important the
design of the regulatory framework, that encompasses both rules and institu-
tions, is for reducing the economy-wide losses associated with systemic events.17
We have argued that we need to consider carefully those rules that allocate pri-
ority rights among the various groups of bank creditors. There is an ongoing
literature on this subject, however, it has mainly been concentrated on single
bank resolutions rather than systemic events. The choice of priority rules can
have a considerable e¤ect on the total losses in the economy due to a systemic
event. We have demonstrated how important this choice is for the simple case
where the network structure is una¤ected by the choice of priority rules. Fu-
ture research should aim to explore this issue for the case when the interbank
network is endogenous. It might be very well the case that when we allow for
the choice of priority rues to a¤ect the formation of links in the interbank mar-
ket, our simple results above do not hold anymore. If di¤erent prioroty rules
encourage or discourage certain entities from investing in the assets of certain
others then rather than monitoring when faced with an enhanced risk, banks
may prefer to invest elsewhere. While to analyse this might be a formidable
task, given its signi…cance for systemic risk policy design, cannot be ignored.18
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